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Highlights
• Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been characterised by a lack of labour productivity
growth, combined with a 60 percent growth in labour costs, 20 percentage points above
euro-area average consumer price growth. As a consequence, Italy has become less
competitive compared to its euro-area partners, the profitability of its firms has
dropped and real GDP-per-capita has flatlined.
• At the root of the substantial discrepancy between wages and productivity is Italy’s
system of centralised wage bargaining which, in many ways, is designed without
regard for the underlying industrial structure and geographical heterogeneity of the
Italian economy. This has fostered perverse incentives and imbalances within Italy.
• Collective wage bargaining, and in particular the determination of base salaries, should
be moved from the national to the regional level for all contracts, in the public and
private sectors. The Mezzogiorno, which might superficially be seen as losing out from
this policy, would actually gain the most in competitiveness terms.
• Furthermore, measures should be taken so that, in the long run, the Italian industrial
structure evolves into a less fragmented small-company-based economy. This firm
consolidation would likely expand the use of firm-level agreements and performance
payments, and would improve Italy’s productivity and competitiveness overall.
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BACkGrOUND
Competitiveness is often presented as a nebulous
concept, lacking a clear workable definition, and
too vague to guide policymaking (Odendahl,
2016). krugman (1994) goes as far as accusing
it of being a “dangerous obsession”, insofar as it
makes people believe that it is countries that com-
pete on the world market, rather than firms. How-
ever, even krugman espouses Laura D’Andrea
Tyson’s definition of competitiveness as “the abil-
ity to produce goods and services that meet the
test of international competition while […] citi-
zens enjoy a standard of living that is both rising
and sustainable” (Tyson, 1993).
It is unquestionable that the euro-area crisis was
preceded by significant competitiveness losses in
several Mediterranean economies (Bénassy-
Quéré, 2015). Several indicators illustrate the evo-
lution of competitiveness at country and sector
level, including current account balances, r&D
expenditure, market share and productivity
(Castellani and koch, 2015). Thimann (2015) looks
at a particular indicator of price competitiveness,
namely nominal unit labour costs (ULC), and by
decomposing it, shows how in some countries
wages and productivity have diverged at a stunning
rate. Italy is among them (Figure 1, right panel).
Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been characterised
by substantially flat labour productivity growth,
combined with a 60 percent growth in labour costs
over an 18-year period. Obviously this divergence
partly reflects inflation developments, although
over that period prices in Italy increased by 10
percentage points less (51.3 percent). However,
within a monetary union real wages deflated with
domestic prices are not a relevant competitive-
ness benchmark (Thimann, 2015). What matters
for purchasing and investment considerations are
nominal prices in euros. And over a comparable
period of time, consumer prices in the euro area
increased by roughly 40 percent.
The result of this widening gap is that over the past
two decades Italy’s ULCs have risen more than
those of its euro-area peers (Figure 1, left panel)
and firm profitability has been eroded. Figure 2
shows how the ratio of gross operating surplus
(revenues net of the cost of intermediate goods
and labour costs) to value-added shrank by a fifth
since 1999, compared to -10 percent in France,
and +8 percent in Germany.
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Figure 1: Nominal unit labour costs (left panel) and labour costs and productivity developments in
Italy (right panel), 1995=100
Source: Bruegel, Eurostat, OECD. Note: Productivity is computed as real GDP per hour worked; wages are computed as
nominal compensation per hour worked. These two metrics are used to calculate nominal unit labour costs.
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1. These are normally joined
by full-time officials from
the unions. 
2. In order to sit at the
bargaining table, trade
unions must represent at
least 5 percent of all trade
union members in the
sector and of votes in the
in-company work councils.
National contractual
arrangements are binding if
signed by trade unions
exceeding a 50 percent
threshold of representative-
ness (computed as the
average of the two metrics)
and approved by a simple
majority of workers through
a referendum. Firm-level
agreements are binding if
signed by a majority of the
work council members.
For rSAs, where work-coun-
cil members are appointed
directly by the unions,
slightly different
rules apply. 
3. The Italian Constitution
requires work to be
remunerated in a way that is
“commensurate with the
quality and quantity” of the
activity carried out
(Article 36).
4. Switzerland ranks first in
the World Economic Forum’s
Global Competitiveness
indicator, Germany ranks
fourth and the Netherlands
fifth, out of 140 countries. 
In line with Tyson’s predictions, Italy’s real GDP-
per-capita has flatlined (Terzi, 2015). Clearly, this
is a great concern not only for rome, but also for
other European capitals, because a country with
feeble growth and very high public debt (132.7
percent of GDP in 2015) is highly exposed to
exogenous macroeconomic shocks and can be a
source of instability for the whole euro area.
Italy stands out as a country that did not manage
to embrace the ICT revolution and live up to the
challenges posed by globalisation, as argued by
Pellegrino and Zingales (2014). However, at the
same time, its labour costs continued to increase.
Interestingly, this trend did not reverse even
with the inception of the crisis, as it did in Spain
and Portugal.
While Italy’s top priority at this point clearly should
be to resurrect productivity growth, ensuring that
wages and productivity stay more aligned could
be a first step towards restoring price competi-
tiveness and preventing the generation of imbal-
ances in the future. To understand why this did not
happen so far, it is important to understand how
wage bargaining works in Italy.
WAGE BARGAINING IN ITALY
In Italy, almost all (97 percent) contracts in pri-
vate-sector establishments are covered by col-
lective bargaining arrangements (Eurofound,
2013). Bargaining can take place at industry- and
company-level. Industry-wide negotiations
between employers and unions establish the
main items of the employment contract, mostly
take place at national level, need to be renewed
every three years and effectively set base salaries
for each job category and level of seniority. On top
of this, they also define, among other things,
hours and holidays, health and safety, training
and the use of temporary workers.
Company-level negotiations take place between
the employer and the in-company representatives
elected to work councils (rSU)1, and can modify
only selected items of the nationally-negotiated
contracts, where explicitly allowed by the latter
(so-called escape clauses). This is the level at
which performance premia are usually defined, on
top of company-specific conditions.
In terms of coverage, employers that do not wish
to apply the relevant industry-level national con-
tract need to step out of the employer’s associa-
tion that negotiated it. A prime example of this was
FIAT in January 2012 leaving the employers’ asso-
ciation Confindustria. Conversely, employers can
apply a collective agreement even if they are not
a member of the employers’ association that
signed it.
On the workers’ side, a collective agreement
applies in principle only to the employees that
belong to the negotiating trade unions2. In prac-
tice, labour courts have considered the base
salaries defined in the collective arrangements as
the benchmark for minimum fair pay3, effectively
extending their validity to all workers.
The result is one of the most centralised systems
of wage bargaining among developed economies
(Figure 3). According to a composite index of cen-
tralisation (CWG) developed by the Amsterdam
Institute of Labour studies, Italy’s wage bargain-
ing system is now the most centralised among
southern European economies, after Spain, Por-
tugal and Greece significantly overhauled their
labour market institutions at the peak of the euro-
area crisis.
However, several highly competitive economies4,
such as Switzerland, Germany and the Nether-
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
Germany France Italy
Figure 2: Ratio of gross operating surplus to
value added, 1995=100
Source: Bruegel, Eurostat. Note: Gross operating surplus is
deﬁned as revenues of non-ﬁnancial corporations minus
the cost of intermediate goods (hence value added) minus
compensation of employees. 
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lands, also have levels of wage centralisation that
are similar to Italy’s, if not higher. As such, a high
ranking on the CWG index should not be inter-
preted necessarily as a warning sign of possible
price competitiveness losses on the horizon
(Calmfors and Driffil, 1988).
Instead, centralised wage bargaining, coupled
with other institutional arrangements, can ensure
that wages and productivity do not excessively
diverge, hence safeguarding strict price competi-
tiveness. Italy and Germany have more or less the
same degree of centralisation of wage bargaining
(Figure 3). Germany managed to keep wages
more in line with productivity in the run-up to the
crisis because labour unions responsibly chose
to hold back on their compensation requests in
order to safeguard the country’s competitiveness
(The Economist, 2013). This decision can be
attributed to some degree to Germany’s peculiar
system of co-determination, in which employees’
representatives actively participate in the man-
agement of companies, fostering a climate of
shared responsibility (Dustmann et al, 2014). In
Italy, this did not happen.
Co-determination is not however the only way to
ensure wages and prices move broadly in tandem.
Belgium, another country where wage bargaining
is almost fully centralised, has managed to pre-
vent excessive wage increases thanks to the cre-
ation of a competitiveness council (Sapir and
Wolff, 2015).
However, overlaying a competitiveness council on
the current mechanism of nationwide centralised
wage bargaining will not solve Italy’s entrenched
price competitiveness problems. It should rather
be part of a more wide-reaching reform package.
This is because the current system in Italy seems
to be designed without regard for the underlying
industrial structure and geographical heterogene-
ity of the Italian economy, thereby fostering per-
verse incentives and imbalances.
A STRAITJACKET FOR A HETEROGENEOUS
COUNTRY
Italy is a highly divided country in terms of
incomes in different regions (Figure 4). GDP per
capita in the richest region (Val d’Aosta) is as high
as €37,000, more than twice that of the poorest
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Figure 3: Index of centralisation of wage bargaining, 0-6 (highly centralised)
Source: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies.
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Figure 3: Nominal GDP per capita, Italy = 100
Source: Bruegel based on ISTAT.
region (Calabria) at €16,000. More broadly, Italy
is characterised by a richer north (117 percent of
EU28 GDP per capita), an average centre (108 per-
cent), and a poorer south and islands (64 percent
and 65 percent, respectively). This long-enduring
heterogeneity has been further intensified by the
euro-area crisis since 2009. During the recession
years the south was more affected than the north,
while the nascent (weak) recovery seems to be
being led by the north (The Economist, 2015a).
These sharp income differences translate into dif-
ferent price levels in different regions. Although no
official data on this is produced, Cannari and Iuz-
zolino (2009) estimate the cost of living to be as
much as 20 percent lower in the Mezzogiorno
(south and islands) than in the north. Analysing the
data at provincial level, Boeri et al (2014) find dif-
ferences that can be as great as 28 percent lower in
some areas of Sicily compared to Lombardy.
The current system of national centralised wage
bargaining, both in the public and private sectors,
with its intricate grids of base wages for all job cat-
egories and levels of seniority, leads to perverse
results, such as real wages being in many
instances higher in the south than in the north,
while productivity is significantly higher in the
north (Boeri et al, 2014). Clearly, the price the
Mezzogiorno pays for this is a higher unemploy-
ment rate than the north, as adjustment cannot
take place on the basis of wages and happens on
quantity (Table 1).
5. Some commentators
point out to the fact that the
1:1 conversion rate applied
when forming the German
monetary union also
penalised the East. This
does not invalidate the
point on collective wage
bargaining. As rose et al
(1991) conclude “all things
considered, wage pressure
is a severe problem, but
unions and geography,
rather than the conversion
rate, are to blame”.
6. regarding price levels,
the stronger prevalence
of an informal sector in the
Mezzogiorno is only likely
to amplify the price diver-
gence already observed
with the north, further
crystallising the point
being made. 
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are adding less value than two decades ago. Inter-
estingly, similar dynamics played out in Germany
in the aftermath of reunification in 1990 (Box 1).
We should also briefly draw attention to the
underground economy. Studies highlighting inter-
regional differences in Italy are often downplayed
or dismissed on the grounds that the under-
ground economy, which is more prevalent in the
south, is not picked up by official statistics, hence
distorting the overall conclusions. While this het-
erogeneity in illegality is documented (see for
example Frenda, 2010), it does not invalidate the
reasoning outlined above. Collective wage bar-
gaining only applies to the legal economy, and
should thus cater to regional disparities in pro-
ductivity and wages in the official sector6.
Connected to this point on the underground
economy is the consideration that having a large
wedge between the Mezzogiorno’s equilibrium
level of wages and the base salaries imposed
via centralised wage bargaining might actually
be a distorting incentive. As companies look for
Productivity developments are also quite differ-
ent across Italy. Figure 5 plots real GDP per full-
time equivalent employee, in order to correct for
differences in the use of part-time workers, for the
tradable sector (proxied by manufacturing). Inter-
estingly, since 1995, productivity has increased
by 25 percent in the centre, while it is now below
its 1995 level in the islands (Sicily and Sardinia).
In this context, Figure 5 (right panel) shows how
wages have increased in a very similar way across
Italy (and by too much in all regions). The result-
ing nominal ULCs increased more in the islands
(66 percent) than in the north (48 percent) over
this time period.
Following Thimman (2015), Figure 5 implies that
in effect price competitiveness in the Mezzogiorno
has been eroded even more than in the north by
a nationally centralised wage bargaining system.
All things being equal, an entrepreneur is today
even less likely to choose Sicily or Sardinia as her
place of business, as she would see her profits
squeezed even further, while remunerating more
production inputs – most notably labour – that
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Figure 5: Productivity and labour-cost developments, tradable sector, 1995=100
Source: Bruegel based on ISTAT. Note: Tradable sector here proxied by manufacturing.
Table 1. Unemployment and inactivity rates, regional breakdown
Unemployment rate
Long-term 
unemployment rate
Inactivity rate
age group 15+ 15+ 15-64
Italy 12.1 6.9 35.8
North 8.1 4.1 29.1
Centre 10.7 5.8 31.3
Mezzogiorno 20.1 12.6 46.9
Source: ISTAT.
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alternative ways to safeguard their competitive-
ness and remain in business, they might resort to
informal employment. Clearly, this is also
favoured by an environment in which the public
authorities have less control of the territory.
ESCAPE CLAUSES AND FIRM-LEVEL AGREEMENTS
A legitimate question worth raising at this point
would be why Italy’s two-tier system of wage bar-
gaining, which has allowed for firm-level agree-
ments since 1993, has not managed to prevent
these macroeconomic imbalances from emerging.
There are a number of reasons. First, and fore-
most, firm-level agreements can exploit selected
escape clauses determined in sector contracts,
but are not allowed to overrule base salaries set
at national level.
However, firm-level agreements do allow for pro-
ductivity premia which can top up base salaries
and, at least in principle, are aimed precisely at
anchoring more firmly total compensation and
output per worker. The reasons why this variable
salary component has not been at least some-
what effective as an automatic competitiveness
safety valve are: (i) it represents only a small
share of employees’ total compensation, and (ii)
only few firms decide to embark on the journey of
negotiating firm-level agreements (roughly 30
percent). Productivity premia are therefore small
and not widely used.
This might seem at first sight surprising but is
rooted in the peculiar industrial structure of the
Italian economy, which is characterised by a mul-
titude of very small firms and very few large com-
BOX 1. GERMANY’S REUNIFICATION: A CASE STUDY
Germany’s reunification provides an interesting economic case study for Italy in terms of the result
of imposing quasi-nationwide centralised wage bargaining on highly heterogeneous regions.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the levels of economic development of west and east Germany
were extremely different. GDP per capita in the east was €9400. In the west it was €22000. Produc-
tivity (or GDP per hour worked) in the eastern manufacturing sector was 32.8 percent of the level in
the west (Dornbusch and Wolf, 1992). Snower and Merkl (2006) convincingly illustrate how, at this
point, western labour unions took over wage negotiations in the east, in what the authors call bar-
gaining by proxy. The political justification for this was that eastern labour unions were inexperi-
enced at operating within the western (now German-wide) bargaining procedures. The objective was
to rapidly reach wage-level equality, based on a call for solidarity and equality among workers (Sinn,
2002). In practice, this meant that labour unions rammed through nominal wage increases in the
east, aimed also at stemming mass migration of workers to the west and of western firms to the east.
realising this strategy was going to backfire, eastern labour unions quickly regained control of wage
negotiations and moderated their requests. However, Snower and Merkl (2006) show how the initial
sudden wage increase, coupled with rigid labour market regulations, implied that nominal wages had
been too high with respect to fundamentals for years, undercutting the east’s competitiveness5. In
1991, unit labour costs in the east were more than 150 percent those in the west, and it took almost
10 years for parity to be reached (The Economist, 2015b). Given the adjustment could not easily or
quickly take place along the wage (price) margin, it took place on employment (quantity). From 1991
to the early 2000s, the gap in unemployment between the east and the west widened to reach 200
percent; and this despite significant migration, and yearly net fiscal transfers in the order of magni-
tude of 4 percent of Germany’s GDP (or €80bn/year).
As Snower and Merkl conclude, East Germany’s labour market entered a dire state not despite receiv-
ing significant assistance from the west, but rather “because of the support it has received”.
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7. For example, Art. 6 of the
national contract for work-
ers in the retail, distribution
and services sector effec-
tively prohibits the use of
firm-level agreements for
companies with fewer than
15 employees.
while for firms with 50-199, 200-499 and 500+
employees, the figures are 34.7 percent, 58.8 per-
cent and 61.5 percent respectively.
For firms without in-company work councils, the
protocol would be to escalate the negotiation to a
local employers’ association, which would liaise
with the local labour union representatives. This is
obviously far from optimal because it brings the
problem back to square one, making it harder to
tailor the contract to a company’s specific needs,
with potentially high (time) costs, also because
firm-level contracts must be renegotiated every
three years, and offering limited benefits given the
restrictive nature of escape clauses. In fact, there
are also some instances of escape clauses in
industry-level agreements that prohibit their use
by smaller companies7.
The picture that emerges from the ISTAT and CNEL
survey is one in which the use of firm-level agree-
ments is strongly inversely related to firm size. In
panies, at least by international standards. Almost
60 percent of firm workers (and therefore of con-
tracts) are employed by a company that has fewer
than 20 employees (Figure 5). This compares to
40 percent in the Netherlands, 30 percent in Ger-
many, and 18 percent in the United States.
In general, small firms are less inclined to go down
the route of bargaining at firm-level, given the high
costs involved. However, this reluctance is exac-
erbated by the current two-tier system, which
seems to be have been designed without taking
into account the structure of the Italian private
sector. First, as discussed above, firm-level agree-
ments must be negotiated between an employer
and in-company work councils (rSA/rSU). How-
ever, data from the Italian National Institute for Sta-
tistics and National Economic and Labour Council
(ISTAT and CNEL, 2013) shows how the presence
of in-company rSA/rSUs is proportional to firm
size, and in particular only 7.5 percent of small
firms (10-49 employees) host work councils,
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Figure 6: Employment by enterprise size, 2012
Source: OECD Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2015.
Table 2: Share of enterprises according to geographical location, % of Italy
0-9 10-49 50-249 250+ Total
Italy 100 100 100 100 100
North 49.8 58.7 65.0 66.8 50.2
Centre 21.7 20.5 18.6 20.1 21.6
South 19.8 14.7 11.8 9.1 19.6
Islands 8.7 6.0 4.6 4.0 8.6
Source: Bruegel based on ISTAT.
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8. For similar results in an
EU context, see ECB work
in progress:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
home/pdf/research/comp-
net/20160421/20160421-
06-Paloma_Lopez-Garcia_As
sessing_the_Labour_reallo-
cation_process.pdf 
9. An alternative would be to
negotiate at the level of
Labour Market Areas (SLL),
which are statistical units
defined by ISTAT using com-
muting patterns. They rep-
resent sub-regional
geographical areas in which
the bulk of the labour force
lives and works. While this
would be more appropriate
in strict economic sense, it
is likely to encounter signif-
icant administrative prob-
lems and is therefore not
recommended.
particular, only 27.9 percent of firms with 10-49
employees made use of firm-level agreements in
2012-13, compared to 73.9 percent of companies
with 500+ employees. And not all firm-level con-
tracts activate the productivity clauses. All in all,
productivity premia are being used only by 9.6
percent of small firms, compared to 63.6 percent
of large companies in Italy, for a total of 13.4 per-
cent of all firms.
Firm size in Italy also has regional aspects. More
than half (50.2 percent) of Italy’s firms are located
in the north, and the picture is more bleak when
breaking it down by size (Table 2). In particular,
66.8 percent of companies with 250+ employees,
the size class making greater use of productivity
premia, are located in the north, compared to only
4.0 percent in the Islands. Such a distribution
clearly helps reinforce the productivity and com-
petitiveness divergence between the north and
the Mezzogiorno.
The south is also penalised because, as nominal
wages are already set high by national contracts,
there is less room for manoeuvre than in the north
to top them up with productivity premia at firm-
level. Lower base wages would instead allow
better use of productivity bonuses, contributing to
the revival of labour productivity. Starting from
Lazear (2000), the literature is unanimous in find-
ing strong productivity improvements associated
with the introduction of monetary incentives (for
evidence on Italy, see for example Lucifora and
Origo, 2012). This is because individual workers
may exert increased effort – incentive effect –
and because of a relocation effect, whereby work-
ers will have an added incentive to join high-pro-
ductivity firms (Petrin et al, 2011)8. 
A REFORM PROPOSAL
Over the past two decades, Italy’s social partners
have come together several times to amend the
system of collective bargaining, not only in 1993
as mentioned above, but also in 2009 and 2014.
As Eurofound (2015) neatly puts it, Italy’s “whole
industrial relations system appears to be search-
ing for a new structure”. In strict economic terms,
bringing wage bargaining to the firm-level would be
the first-best solution. As such, extending the use
of escape clauses is often presented by econo-
mists as a silver-bullet. However, our analysis sug-
gests it would not be, given that most (small) firms
are still unlikely to be able to exploit the escape
clauses fully within the current setting. Micro-enter-
prises have proven unready to enter into time-con-
suming, repetitive negotiations with labour unions,
and the latter cannot be bypassed within the cur-
rent constitutional order. As such, extending the
use of escape clauses should be part of a more
holistic reform of collective bargaining.
A comprehensive reform should rather be com-
posed of a wide variety of measures, aimed at (1)
alleviating the problems connected to the current
system already in the short term, and (2) fully
addressing them over a longer term.
For the short term, collective wage bargaining, and
in particular the determination of base salaries,
should unequivocally be moved from the national
to the regional9 level for all contracts, in the public
and private sector. This (second best) measure is
aimed at tackling immediately the geographical
differences we have discussed, and should
be seen as a first step in the direction of wage
decentralisation.
While at first sight it might sound problematic that
the government of a unitary state should pay its
employees differently based on their location, it
is crucial that this reform applies also to the public
sector. If, as a result of regionalisation, salaries in
lower-productivity regions were to begin adjusting
in the private sector only, the gap between public
and private sector wages would widen. As dis-
cussed by Giordano et al (2011), relatively high
wages in the public sector crowd out the private
sector, draining the most skilled workers, forcing
firms into a wage race to the top (Lamo, Perez and
Schuknecht, 2008), leading to deteriorating com-
petitiveness and greater unemployment prob-
lems. Caponi (2014) shows how this
phenomenon is already at play in Italy, contribut-
ing to up to 40 percent of the unemployment gap
between the north and the south. Crucially, this
problem would not be addressed by simply pro-
moting firm-level bargaining or escape clauses. 
In terms of political feasibility, this regionalisation
10
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should not be seen as overly controversial. First,
this is already common practice for selected sec-
tors such as agriculture, construction and tourism.
Second, a move to the regional level could hardly
be seen as a radical attack on the current system
of centralised wage bargaining, but is rather
common practice among even highly centralised
countries with a high degree of territorial hetero-
geneity (eg Germany). Third, parts of the labour
unions (most notably CISL, and partially UIL10)
have expressed their readiness to make more use
of regional-level bargaining, which currently in
Italy is used to a very limited extent. Finally, a
somewhat similar mechanism, which allowed for
differentiation in salaries at sub-national level
based on living costs, was in place in Italy for
almost 20 years in the immediate post-war period.
This suggests a similar arrangement could be
compatible with Italy’s constitutional order.
Once this decentralisation step is taken, a con-
sortium of competitiveness councils could be
established at the regional level given that this is
where the collective bargaining would take place,
in line with the spirit and rationale of Sapir
and Wolff (2015). This would be aimed at ensur-
ing a better tracking of productivity and wage
developments.
One word of caution is warranted. Some will
oppose such measures, claiming they penalise
the south, which would eventually see lower nom-
inal salaries compared to the north. While a uni-
form economic development of the country can
surely be regarded as desirable, artificially equal-
ising salaries is a Pyrrhic victory. As the example of
Germany’s reunification illustrates (Box 1), exces-
sively high nominal wages with respect to produc-
tivity are likely to have contributed to the south’s
higher level of unemployment and low investment
levels. In order to achieve territorial convergence,
the government should rather concentrate on
increasing productivity levels in the south, by
means of investment in infrastructure, human cap-
ital, improving the efficiency of the public sector11,
combating organised crime and so on.
Furthermore, measures should be taken to allevi-
ate the current difficulties small and medium
enterprises have in using firm-level agreements,
10. Confederazione Italiana
Sindacati Lavoratori and
Unione Italiana del Lavoro.
As reported by ETUI:
http://www.worker-partici-
pation.eu/National-Indus-
trial-relations/Countries/Ita
ly/Collective-Bargaining. 
11. For an insightful discus-
sion on the impact of public
sector inefficiency on
private sector productivity,
see Giordano et al (2015)
and thus productivity premia. This could take sev-
eral forms, such as outlawing the limitation of
escape clauses based on firm size and removing
the 15-workers requirement to set up work coun-
cils (rSU). Finally, the current preferential tax rate
on productivity premia (10 percent up to a ceiling
of €2000 per worker) could be further strength-
ened for small enterprises.
While all these measures will surely help, in order
to address more radically some of the problems
associated with the current two-tier system of
wage bargaining, measures should be taken so
that, in the long run, the Italian industrial structure
evolves into a less fragmented, small-company-
based, economy. In order to reach that stage, as
numerous studies have pointed out, policy needs
to include: (i) radical product market liberalisation,
(ii) improving firm access to credit and financial
markets, (iii) improving judicial efficiency, and (iv)
reforming bankruptcy laws (see for example Calli-
garis et al, 2016; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006;
OECD, 2003; Giacomelli and Menon, 2013; kumar
et al, 1999). This consolidation is not only likely
to expand the use of firm-level agreements and
productivity clauses, completing the process of
full wage decentralisation, but also to improve
Italy’s productivity and competitiveness overall
(Tiffin, 2014). As Altomonte et al (2016) show,
large firms are more likely to invest more in r&D
and innovate, be more successful on international
markets and exploit global value chains. Moreover,
large firms tend to attract better management,
which in turn fosters productivity, profitability,
growth and firm survival (Bloom et al, 2014).
CONCLUSIONS
As a country that has experienced over the past
two decades rising nominal wages, flat productiv-
ity and essentially no GDP-per-capita growth,
Italy’s economic malaise is undeniable. Policies
could be put in place to ensure, at least over the
short run, that Italy retains its price competitive-
ness. It must be noted, however, that as stressed
by Altomonte et al (2016), competitiveness in
developed countries is connected very strongly
with non-price elements. This suggests that, after
having reformed collective wage bargaining in
order to tackle some of the large macroeconomic
11
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